

AD-A190 973


NEEDED: A STRATEGY FOR THE TECHNICAL TRAINING OF  
RESERVISTS(U) LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT INST BETHESDA MD  
D W SRULL ET AL. OCT 87 LMI-RA503R1 MDA903-85-C-0139


1/1

UNCLASSIFIED

F/8 15/1

NL





AD-A190 973

2

DTIC FILE COPY

NEEDED: A STRATEGY  
FOR THE  
TECHNICAL TRAINING  
OF RESERVISTS

Report RA503R1

DTIC  
ELECTE  
MAR 15 1988  
S D  
AD

October 1987

Donald W. Srull  
Edward D. Simms, Jr.  
Dayton S. Pickett

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Approved for public release  
Distribution Unlimited

Prepared pursuant to Department of Defense Contract MDA903-85-C-0139.  
The views expressed here are those of the Logistics Management Institute at  
the time of issue but not necessarily those of the Department of Defense.  
Permission to quote or reproduce any part must - except for Government  
purposes - be obtained from the Logistics Management Institute.

LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE  
6400 Goldsboro Road  
Bethesda, Maryland 20817-5886

10 7 10 047

A-1

**Executive Summary****NEEDED: A STRATEGY FOR THE TECHNICAL TRAINING  
OF RESERVISTS**

The most serious, continuing challenge to a workable Total Force Policy is adequate training for early-deploying reservists,\* especially those of the Army with logistics support assignments. Current policies, programs, and resources do not effectively address the difficulties inherent in building and maintaining adequate technical skill levels in part-time military personnel. As equipment shortage problems of reserve units continue to be corrected, the lack of a workable training strategy will emerge as the limit on Total Force effectiveness. That must not happen.

Under current war planning, all Military Services depend on the reserve components for immediate logistics support – the Army's dependence being the greatest in both absolute and percentage terms. It is vital that reservists be able to fulfill maintenance, supply, and transportation needs without postmobilization training. In other words, under the Total Force Policy reserve logistics personnel with early-deployment assignments must be trained during peacetime to the same levels of proficiency as active personnel.

The reserve component environment makes technical training extremely difficult. Reservists have severely restricted and interrupted time available for training. Reserve units usually are small in size and geographically spread – often great distances from supported units and work facilities. The training problem is made even more difficult when training depends heavily on on-the-job training and on-the-job experience, as it does for most technical specialties. Small reserve units with few authorized positions in each of a wide variety of skills find it difficult, if not impossible, to conduct conventional, on-the-job training within the unit. Lack of mission equipment, training devices, and sufficient full-time staff add to the burden.

---

\*In this report, the term "reserve," in lower-case type, is generic, including both National Guard and Military Department Reserve Forces.

The greatest difficulty comes from the fact that the training environment of the reserve components is fundamentally different from that of the active forces. Availability and dispersion of both personnel and equipment, as well as size of units and availability of training time, are all so different that the training strategy used for full-time active component personnel cannot be expected to work for the reserve forces. A strategy peculiar to the reserve component environment is called for.

At the present time, the Services follow essentially the same strategy to train reservists that they follow to train active force personnel. That practice results in serious training deficiencies for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. The same deficiencies could be experienced in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force if their reserve/active billet ratios increased or if the education and experience levels of their recruits declined.

A truly effective training strategy must include improved personnel management. Reserve technical training problems are less severe when reserve units are able to recruit and retain significant numbers of prior-active-duty people already trained and experienced in the skills needed. The Navy and Air Force reserve components have been relatively successful in this regard, with between one-third and three-fourths of key technical skill jobs being filled with people who have had relevant active duty experience. Because the Army's support structure is concentrated in the reserve components (about 60 percent), it is difficult for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces to recruit sufficient numbers of trained, prior-active-service people. The recent success of the active Army in retaining a large fraction of successful first-term soldiers makes the problem even more difficult. Fewer than 10 percent of Army reserve enlisted logistics specialists have had prior-active-service training or experience related to their reserve assignments.

The issue of adequacy of training for Army reservists has raised concern about the viability of the Total Force Policy. If adequate individual training of reservists cannot be accomplished within available Military Service resources, the only alternatives would seem to be a redesign of Army force structure and/or war plans, a shift in resources among Military Services, or a redefinition of the Total Force Policy. We believe, however, that the reserve training problem *can* be brought under control, provided a DoD-wide program with both high-level support and policy guidance is established to do so.

We believe that a fresh, overall look at reserve training is needed. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) initiate a periodic major review (e.g., biennial) of reserve component training involving all Military Services and components. Since the responsibility for Total Force training policy is now divided between the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), both offices should be active participants. The initial review meeting should assemble the senior training management officials (active and reserve) from all Services and:

1. Define the major training issues affecting the reserve components
2. Allow for free exchange of ideas
3. Outline a broad training strategy for reserve training
4. Develop and prioritize a set of specific initiatives toward implementing the strategy.

Actions worthy of inclusion in the new reserve training strategy are:

1. Actively recruit more people already trained and experienced by virtue of civilian occupation and/or prior active military training.
2. Retain the trained, experienced people now in reserve units for longer periods of time, even if personnel policies need to be adjusted.
3. Lengthen initial training for new reservists beyond what new active duty personnel receive.
4. Expand the regional technical training center concept and accelerate its implementation.
5. Make more use of civil sector training capabilities.
6. Assure that full-time military/civilian staffing at the unit level is adequate to support training objectives.
7. Establish a training devices program aimed explicitly at the training of reservists.

A workable reserve training strategy is a formidable challenge. It requires innovation, resource reallocation, and high-level support, as well as businesslike approach to planning and implementation. The alternatives, however, make it a clear first choice.

## CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Executive Summary . . . . .	v
Chapter 1. Introduction . . . . .	1- 1
Background . . . . .	1- 2
Scope and Organization of the Report . . . . .	1- 4
Chapter 2. Present Training Practices . . . . .	2- 1
Introduction . . . . .	2- 1
Apprentice Training . . . . .	2- 1
Journeyman Training . . . . .	2- 4
Master Training . . . . .	2- 5
Sustainment Training . . . . .	2- 6
Summary . . . . .	2- 6
Chapter 3. The Reserve Component Training Environment . . . . .	3- 1
Time Available for Training . . . . .	3- 1
Isolation of Units . . . . .	3- 1
Chapter 4. Elements of a New Training Strategy . . . . .	4- 1
Definition . . . . .	4- 1
Essential Characteristics . . . . .	4- 2
Reduce Training Requirements . . . . .	4- 3
Improve Inactive Duty Training . . . . .	4- 6
Establish Review Mechanisms . . . . .	4-11
Chapter 5. Recommendations . . . . .	5- 1



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Since the adoption of the Total Force Policy in 1973, all of the Military Services have increased their dependence on the early use of reserve component units in all major scenarios. Historically, reserve forces were used to expand the operational active forces after the initial phases of a conflict. The implied strategy was to fight the early battles with active forces and provide time for reserve forces to mobilize, train, and be equipped prior to deployment. As the Total Force Policy was implemented, the strategy for the use of reserve forces changed dramatically — especially with Army land forces.

Today, under current war plans, many reserve<sup>1</sup> units are required to mobilize, deploy, and be operational in a theater of combat operations within 30 days. These units are critical because in many mission areas, the active forces are no longer self-sufficient to conduct sustained operations and must rely on reserve units to provide immediate logistics support.

This new reserve role of rapid mobilization and deployment requires reserve units to maintain high levels of readiness continuously during peacetime. Over the last 15 years, much planning has been done to expedite the administrative events (e.g., personnel and medical records screening) that must be accomplished prior to deployment. Additionally, the Military Services have emphasized improving the equipment status (fill, condition, and modernization) of reserve units since the early 1980s. These actions support rapidly deploying combat-ready reserve units.

But will the Total Force still work when the question of reserve training is considered? Much debate continues about the advisability of retaining large-scale, early-deploying, critical mission area responsibilities in the reserve components because of the uncertain ability of part-time reservists to maintain the high levels of skill called for by imminent combat operations.

---

<sup>1</sup>In this report, the term "reserve," in lower-case type, is generic, including both National Guard and Reserve Forces of the Military Departments.

This report describes the changes we think need to be made to raise individual technical skills in reserve component units to a level commensurate with their war plan assignments. Our conclusions and recommendations are derived from several efforts over the last 4 years analyzing technical skills in reserve logistics units.

## **BACKGROUND**

### **Force Structure Dependence**

Although the Services plan to use reserve forces in most mission areas, the earliest and most critical dependence on reserve units in war plans is in the logistics support mission area. All Services rely on early deploying reserve units more for logistics support than for other types of wartime missions. Because the logistics workload associated with supporting the normal day-to-day activity of combat units of the active forces during peacetime is much lower than that expected during wartime, the United States has transferred many logistics support missions to the reserve components. This is particularly true in the Army. Today, the Army force structure has over 70 percent of the critical nondivision supply, maintenance, and transportation units in either the Army Guard or Army Reserve. In contrast to the other Services, the Army has placed more than half of all logistics specialty billets in the reserve components (Table 1-1). While the other Services have retained enough logistics forces in the active component to satisfy the initial needs of active combat forces during most scenarios, active Army combat units require immediate and substantial support from reserve logistics units under any scenario.

**TABLE 1-1**  
**LOGISTICS BILLETS**

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps
Active	48%	82%	73%	80%
Guard/Reserve	52%	18%	27%	20%

### **Reserve Component Population**

Traditionally, nations have manned reserve units with individuals who have completed at least one term of active military service. The typical new accession into

the reserve components had already completed initial skills training, had over a year of hands-on job experience in active units, and was qualified to perform at a senior apprentice- or journeyman-level of skill. The primary training tasks of reserve units were to sustain these previously acquired skills, update the skills to match new equipment, and provide some opportunity for advanced skill training.

Today in the Army, Marine Corps, and (to a lesser extent) Air Force, the incumbent population is very different from the very experienced group of earlier years. The characteristics of reservists shown in Table 1-2 are based on a detailed analysis of over 44,000 reservists holding 28 technical logistics skills across all reserve components during 1985. It is clear that active component units no longer provide the training foundation for Army and Marine Corps reservists.

**TABLE 1-2**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT INCUMBENTS IN TECHNICAL LOGISTICS SKILLS<sup>a</sup>**  
(Variations affecting trainability)

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps
High school graduate or higher	84%	89%	98%	93%
Prior active service, any skill	22%	77%	55%	31%
Prior active service, related skill	6%	64%	35%	16%
Full-time support	11%	14%	31%	14%
Related civilian occupation	NM	NM	35%	NM

*Note:* NM - Data not maintained in the Service

<sup>a</sup> LMI Report RA401, *Logistics Skill Development in the Reserve Components* Sruell, Donald W., Edward D. Simms, Jr., and Dayton S. Pickett Oct 1985 p. 2-3

### The Training Issue

The reserve training task faced by the Services is more complex and more urgent than ever before. After adoption of the Total Force Policy, dependence on the reserve components has grown to the point where many reserve units are required to deploy overseas immediately after mobilization without any additional training. Current war plans do not allow time for reservists to significantly increase (or even polish) their skills prior to commitment to the theater of operations. This means that the Services must continually maintain high levels of skill in early-deploying

reserve units during peacetime; they cannot rely on postmobilization training opportunities.

## **SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT**

This report presents our ideas on what we believe are the critical elements of an effective training strategy for Selected Reservists, including some specific reserve training initiatives that support that strategy. The focus is on creating and maintaining technical skills of individual enlisted reservists in the reserve unit environment. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of current reserve training practices; Chapter 3 describes the critical aspects of the reserve training environment. In Chapter 4, we describe our training proposals. Chapter 5 contains our recommendations.

## CHAPTER 2

### PRESENT TRAINING PRACTICES

#### INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the individual training presently afforded members of the reserve. In the sections that follow, we have grouped that training into four general categories: apprentice training, journeyman training, master training, and sustainment training. While the lines dividing these categories are not always clear cut, the groupings aid in discussing and understanding the training of individual Service members.

The first three types of training — apprentice, journeyman, and master — are associated with specific skill levels within an occupational area. The objectives are to improve an individual's proficiency in each skill required by his job and to enlarge the number of skills in which he is proficient. These three types of training support the skill upgrading process as an individual progresses through a career.

Apprentices are defined as those with the skill to perform the most basic and elementary job requirements of an occupation. There are two categories of apprentices: *junior* apprentices have had little hands-on job experience and require direct supervision, while *senior* apprentices can accomplish many basic tasks unsupervised. Journeymen can perform normal technical tasks routinely and can guide the work of apprentices at the job site. Masters have extensive technical knowledge and job experience and can accomplish unexpected tasks as well as give technical oversight to others.

Sustainment training is focused on the reinforcement and retention of skills already learned. Normally it involves the practice and periodic repetition of known tasks and is less formal than the other types of training.

#### APPRENTICE TRAINING

Upon entry into the reserve, all non-prior-service accessions attend a formal course of training — initial skills training — immediately following basic military training. Initial skills training provides the reservist with beginning or entry-level

skills and abilities in his military job. The training is accomplished by the training institutions of all four Services in a similar way for both active duty and reserve accessions who have not had previous military service. It is given to members of the reserve along with their active component trainee counterparts in the same training sections, flights, companies, or classes. The training programs are the same for members of the active and reserve forces. Depending somewhat on the specialty to be trained, the training prepares the Service member for performing junior apprentice-level duties; that is, very basic jobs with supervision.

In all of the Services, initial skills training programs are designed with the active component service member in mind. Although a common active and reserve training program saves money, the policy is flawed in at least two ways with respect to training reservists. First, the initial skills training program prepares apprentices to work in a variety of jobs and on a range of equipment, so that assignments can thereafter be made to different types of units. Because the active component trainees' assignments are not known and rotation among units is expected, the training program is built as a broad-gauged course of instruction suitable for any and all possible assignments. This is especially true in specialties that concentrate on equipment and equipment maintenance.<sup>1</sup> In contrast, all members of the Selected Reserve know their unit assignments when they begin initial skills training. This means each reservist knows the equipment and mission of his unit, and his expected role in that particular unit. In most cases these broad-gauged courses are unnecessary or inefficient for reservists. For example, time used to acquaint reserve trainees with several kinds of jet engines that they will not work on could be better used to learn more completely the characteristics of the specific jet engine used in their known unit of assignment.

The second flaw in common active/reserve initial skills training is that apprentices are expected to complete much of their training in the unit; initial skills training in most cases provides only a fraction of apprentice-level skill requirements. Most military jobs include many tasks specifically designated to be learned in the unit. In these cases, only designated job tasks are taught during initial skills training; the remainder are deferred, to be learned later. The determination of

---

<sup>1</sup>This problem of unnecessarily broad skill training for reservists is most severe in those military specialties with the greatest breadth of tasks and responsibilities. Where the scope of the specialty is narrower, as among many of the Naval Enlisted Codes, the problem for reservists is lessened.

which tasks (how many and which ones) are to be omitted from initial skills training and taught later in the unit is based on the ability of an *active* unit to provide the required additional training time, manpower, and equipment resources. Reserve units are simply not able to match any of these resources normally available to active units. It seems clear that a different approach is needed in deciding how thorough initial skills training should be for new reserve component members. It should not teach unneeded skills, but it should teach skills the unit cannot teach.

The Services follow different practices for new reservists who have had prior active military experience in occupational areas *other* than that of their present assignment. The Air Force and Navy require them to attend full programs of initial skills training, which may involve several consecutive courses. The Army desires that all such enlistees attend these programs, but in practice a majority do not. These individuals are accepted into reserve units and embark upon lengthy attempts to acquire new job skills while attending unit training assemblies during Inactive Duty Training (IDT). The Army expends considerable effort to "configure" the initial skills training courses taught in its formal school system for use within reserve units by reservists with prior military experience in other specialties who require training in their new jobs. In the case of many technical military jobs, these "configured" courses require several years of part-time training and a considerable amount of training equipment, which is often not available to the unit. It is questionable whether this approach can realistically be expected to work. The Army has long believed that a policy of requiring reservists of this type to complete a formal initial skills training program for new skills would cause unacceptable recruiting losses for reserve units. We believe the Army should review this policy and determine whether or not stricter enforcement (as in the Air Force and Navy) would be beneficial in the long run.

The Marine Corps awards to new reserve accessions only about a dozen new specialties through on-the-job training (OJT). This means that those members of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve who have active component experience but who have never qualified in their reserve specialty (1) are limited to a small number of military jobs, or (2) must agree to complete a full initial skills training program at the beginning of their reserve enlistment.

## JOURNEYMAN TRAINING

Journeyman status is achieved in all Military Services through OJT and on-the-job experience (OJE).<sup>2</sup> The training concept at this level is to put the individual in a unit where he can gain experience by performing a job similar to his wartime job. Additionally, his experience is regularly augmented by informal training sessions related to his job. All of this training is managed and conducted by the unit and makes use of the resources normally available to the unit. Although the concept is the same for all Services, there are detailed differences in the way each executes the concept.

The most structured, standardized approach to OJT exists in the Air Force, where the basis for OJT (as well as all other individual specialty training) is the Specialty Training Standard (STS). An STS is a combination job description and career development roadmap. It lists the tasks to be performed and the standards of task performance for each skill level for that specialty. It identifies the tasks to be taught (to specified levels of knowledge and task performance) during institutional training and those to be taught – and at what stage of development – during OJT. The STS, when properly annotated and kept with the unit records of the individual airman, becomes a step-by-step job proficiency guide with technical references, supervisor checklists, and other important training addenda. The Air Force adds authority to the structure and standardization inherent in the STS by requiring periodic review and endorsement by unit leaders and by routinely performing Inspector General spot-checks of actual airman job performance.

The accomplishment of OJT in the Army is aided by the use of Soldier's Manuals, Trainer's Guides, and Job Books. Soldiers normally have all three of these publications available in units. In addition, Army specialists of the active forces must periodically pass a Skill Qualification Test (SQT), the results of which are used as part of the screening that accompanies promotion consideration. Although on a less frequent basis, members of the Army's reserve components are given the same SQT; the results are not used in promotion considerations.

Skill enhancement through OJT is conducted on the least formal basis in the Navy and Marine Corps, although Marines should have the benefit of a newly

---

<sup>2</sup>OJE refers to the practice and improvement of job skills through routine, repetitive, mission-related work of the individuals of the unit.



structured, systematic OJT program similar to that of the Air Force by the end of FY89. The Navy does test the growing skills of sailors through its Personnel Qualification System, but the tests are designed for skills not related to any specific rating; rather they cover activities (such as firefighting and damage control) of common interest.

## MASTER TRAINING

The training strategy for the master skill level is to conduct advanced training through a combination of OJT and formal school instruction. Again, the same approach is used for both active and reserve component personnel. Experience shows that reservists do not attend these midcareer schools which can be up to 18 weeks in length. For example, during FY82 and FY83 in the Army, where over 50 percent of the logistics billets are in the reserve, fewer than 5 percent of the attendees at the logistics skill master courses were reservists. Only in the Marine Corps, where master status sometimes requires the award of a new, more advanced Military Occupation Specialty (MOS), are such advanced courses mandatory for grade advancement; in the other Services, these courses are highly desirable but not mandatory. The Air Force requires enlisted persons to complete successfully the portions of the annotated STS (including standard tests) appropriate for grade advancement to master level. Our earlier work<sup>3</sup> showed that enlisted specialists in the reserve components of all Services except the Marine Corps<sup>4</sup> attain the master-level grades of E6 and E7 more slowly than do their active force counterparts. In no case, however, is the time-in-grade difference longer than 3.5 years.

Where levels of full-time support for reserve component units are high, many of these support people serve as E6 and E7 masters. These support staff members are in a position to attend any required midcareer courses, whose length would preclude attendance by most drilling reservists. As masters, they also act as mentors and trainers for the journeymen and apprentices of the unit.

---

<sup>3</sup>LMI Report RA401. *Logistics Skill Development in the Reserve Components*. Srull, Donald W., Edward D. Simms, Jr., and Dayton S. Pickett. Oct 1985.

<sup>4</sup>Enlisted specialists of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve actually experience shorter time-in-grade service at both E6 and E7 than do active force Marines in the same specialties.

## **SUSTAINMENT TRAINING**

Because of the requirement for many reserve units to deploy immediately upon mobilization, previously learned skills have to be sustained continuously. Like the other types of training, reserve sustainment training programs are patterned after the active training programs. In all Services, the unit commander is responsible for conducting sustainment training. In general, units rely mainly on OJE for this training, augmented by short refresher classes taught in the unit with unit resources.

## **SUMMARY**

An important fact about training individuals in technical specialties, once they are assigned to units of the force, is that the individual Service member is expected to sustain skills and abilities learned in institutional training while learning enhanced and additional skills as well. In some cases, the enlisted reservist will complete his or her career and reach retirement without ever returning to a training institution for training beyond initial skills training.

In general, the approach followed by all Services has been to design and build training programs to satisfy the needs of the active component and then, with minor modifications, to use these same programs to train reservists. The resulting training strategy is one that minimizes the amount of time spent in formal initial skills training, does not exploit the knowledge of reservist's unit assignment, relies heavily on the unit's capability to provide OJT and OJE within normal unit resources, and requires lengthy midcareer training at formal Service schools. This is a strategy that may work well in full-time, operational, active component units but is not very effective within the very different training environment of the reserve components.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THE RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING ENVIRONMENT**

The principal reason why active component training approaches often are not effective when applied to reservists is the different environment in which reserve units train. Although there are many differences between active component and reserve component training environments, the following are the fundamental differences that an effective reserve training strategy must accommodate.

#### **TIME AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING**


By virtue of their reserve status, reservists have significantly less overall training time available than their active counterparts. In general, drilling enlisted reservists are expected to train between 38 and 60 days a year. This number of days should be considered the maximum time available for training, since reservists are expected to accomplish many administrative tasks during unit assemblies.

In addition to the reservists having less overall time, the continuity of the training time in the active component and the reserve component is very different. Reservists do not have long, continuous blocks of time that can be dedicated to individual technical skill training. The typical training cycle for a reserve unit is to train one weekend (IDT for 2 to 3 days) a month and to attend one extended training period (Annual Training for 2 weeks) a year. Although a small number of units have longer Annual Training or additional IDT periods, most drilling enlisted men and women train for fewer than 50 days per year. For example, enlisted members of the Army National Guard trained an average of 47.1 days in FY85 and were projected to train an average of 47.7 days in FY86.

#### **ISOLATION OF UNITS**

The second characteristic distinguishing the active component training environment from that of the reserve components is the relative isolation of reserve units. This physical isolation follows from the fact that a large number of small units – roughly 2,800 in the Army reserve components – are scattered throughout the 50 states and territories. Dispersion complicates the job of providing specific

technical skill training to unit members. As an example, Figure 3-1 shows the 115 company-size, nondivisional reserve component units that, by Army doctrine, would be required to provide maintenance support to the M-1 tank; a number of individual reservists in each of these locations would require M-1 maintenance skill training.



**FIG. 3-1. DISPERSION OF ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT MAINTENANCE UNITS  
REQUIRED TO SUPPORT M-1 ABRAMS TANK**

A second aspect of reserve component unit isolation is the fact that, unlike active component personnel, reservists cannot be transferred and rotated among units; full-time civilian job and residence fix the individual's unit association. For this reason, each reserve component unit is in effect an individual manpower, personnel, and training element and, in many respects, isolated from other units and groups of units. This relative nontransferability of people among units has an impact on training and skill/career progression opportunities for the reservist in

very important ways, as compared with his active forces counterpart. Other effects of this unique reserve component manpower constraint will be discussed later.

### **Unit Location**

Active units are normally concentrated in clusters within which many similar or related units are located near each other. In CONUS, most active units are stationed on large installations, contiguous with their parent unit. Overseas, active units are normally stationed either on large installations or on smaller installations concentrated in a relatively small geographic area. For example, although the U.S. Army in Europe occupies many small *Kasernen*, almost all of these are located in the southern half of West Germany, an area about the size of Pennsylvania.

In contrast, various types of reserve units are distributed across the United States and several territories. Units can be located hundreds of miles from the units they support and from other similar units. An extreme example is the maintenance battalion of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Force Service Support Group, which is spread from Massachusetts to Texas and from New York to California (Figure 3-2). Travel time between units and training facilities/areas is a significant constraint on short, periodic IDT of reservists.

### **Skill Density**

Because of the concentrated nature of active unit stationing, the density of personnel in one area with the same job classification, and therefore with similar training needs, is high. Large, extensive training facilities can justifiably be constructed and equipment concentrated at a single installation when there are large numbers of personnel needing identical training.

Conversely, the dispersed nature of the reserve component unit stationing results in a very low density of personnel in any given area with the same job classification and the same training needs. To demonstrate this difference between the active and reserve environments, the geographic concentration of apprentice skill billets for several selected MOSs in the Army is shown in Table 3-1. As shown, average densities of apprentice-level soldiers are typically 5 to 10 times lower in the reserve component.

Another impact of the smaller unit size and unit isolation is the potential unavailability of senior (master skill level) personnel at the unit to instruct and




FIG. 3-2. 4TH MAINTENANCE BATTALION, SELECTED MARINE CORPS RESERVE

guide the junior (apprentice and journeymen skill level) people. Since the completion of apprentice training and the conduct of journeyman-level training are expected to be carried out by the unit, these master skill level people are essential to a viable training program; they are also the unit's technical experts in their job area. The average number of master-level personnel at a location is shown in Table 3-2 for several Army MOSs. Again, densities are typically 5 to 10 times lower in the reserve component.

**TABLE 3-1**  
**ARMY APPRENTICE SKILL DENSITY**  
**(Four selected specialties)**

MOS	Component					
	Active		Guard		Reserve	
	Number of locations	Average density	Number of locations	Average density	Number of locations	Average density
6381 Light Weight Vehicle Mechanic	60	100	737	11	515	8
64C1 Motor Transportation Operator	66	105	589	22	369	17
71L1 Administrative Specialist	94	55	610	8	561	17
76Y1 Supply Specialist	86	57	764	7	622	6

**TABLE 3-2**  
**ARMY MASTER SKILL DENSITY**  
**(Four selected specialties)**

MOS	Component					
	Active		Guard		Reserve	
	Number of locations	Average density	Number of locations	Average density	Number of locations	Average density
6383 Light Weight Vehicle Mechanic	65	20	487	2	333	2
64C3 Motor Transportation Operator	96	12	322	5	112	1
71L3 Administrative Specialist	118	16	106	3	240	8
76Y3 Supply Specialist	138	23	743	4	588	4

Not only is the average number of masters at a reserve location much lower than in the active forces, but many reserve locations with apprentices do not have masters. In comparing Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, we find that all active locations with apprentices have some masters assigned, while many reserve locations have apprentices with no masters authorized. For example in the National Guard, the 63B apprentice is authorized at 737 locations (Table 3-1), but the 63B master is authorized at only 487 locations (Table 3-2). Therefore, we expect that there are at least 250 Army National Guard locations where 63B apprentices do not have a master to help in training. If we continue this analysis across the four Army specialties used as examples in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, and if we combine this information with that available for journeymen in these same military jobs, the seriousness of apprentice isolation in reserve units – one or several apprentices at locations with no journeyman or master in the same specialty – becomes even clearer. Table 3-3 shows that information.

**TABLE 3-3**  
**ISOLATED ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT APPRENTICES<sup>a</sup>**  
**(Four selected specialties)**

MOS	Apprentices without journeymen (minimum number of locations)		Apprentices without masters (minimum number of locations)	
	Guard	Reserve	Guard	Reserve
63B1 Light Weight Vehicle Mechanic	110	123	250	182
64C1 Motor Transportation Operator	259	159	267	197
71L1 Administrative Specialist	441	248	504	321
76Y1 Supply Specialist	257	282	21	34

<sup>a</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) *Evaluation of Future Requirements and Acquisition of Nonsystem Training Devices for the Army Guard and Army Reserve*, Washington, DC 1 Feb 1986 pp. A-1 to A-3



## Filling Vacancies and Training

In the active forces, centralized personnel management systems assign and distribute trained personnel to ensure that vacant billets in units are quickly filled with qualified people. Total vacancies are statistically projected in advance, and training "seats" can be programmed to ensure that the training system output of trained people will be adequate to keep unit billets filled with trained personnel. In such a centralized manpower system, even when projections or requirements prove to be inaccurate, the system can redistribute or "cross-level" trained individuals among all units to minimize the impact. The aggregate training "pipeline," in this respect, is an important asset that can be used to offset errors in forecasting total personnel losses in particular skills. Because the number of people in training at any one time is large, and because untrained people cannot be deployed if mobilization should occur, the number of people in training is separately authorized and accounted for *outside unit authorizations*.<sup>1</sup>

By contrast, in the reserve components the personnel management system cannot be operated as a centralized, aggregate system. This is because the reserve system cannot "cross-level" or transfer trained people from one unit to another (except in very small geographic areas and in special cases) to reduce the effect of specific skill imbalances. When a specifically trained person unexpectedly leaves a given reserve unit, the replacement process usually is a very long one. It begins with finding a suitable recruit within the local community and ends months or years later with a trained person in that unit. No centralized pool of reserve accessions or training "pipeline" exists to replace a specific shortage within a given unit. For these reasons, the management and control of reserve component individual skill training is fundamentally more complex and less precise than it is in the active component. The net effect of these differences is that the problems created by the loss of a trained guardsman or reservist — especially in skills with long, complex

---

<sup>1</sup>Unlike the active forces, the reserve forces *do not* have separately authorized accounts for trainees; people in training or awaiting training are carried against authorized positions in their ultimate unit of assignment (one exception is the Air National Guard, which assigns trainees to Training Squadron positions, rather than their ultimate unit of assignment). The number of people in the training pipeline can be significant. For example, of the 49,000 enlisted personnel assigned to medical specialist positions in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, 19 percent are undergoing or awaiting training. There is an OSD initiative, sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) in early 1987, to establish separately authorized trainee accounts for each of the reserve components.

training requirements — are more severe and take longer to correct than in the active forces.

## CHAPTER 4

### ELEMENTS OF A NEW TRAINING STRATEGY

#### DEFINITION

During our studies of reserve technical training, we have found it useful to analyze the basic, overall approach to reserve training, rather than just focus on individual training programs one at a time. We refer to an overall, integrated plan for training as a "training strategy."

*Training Strategy:* An overall, integrated plan for training individuals to perform satisfactory work in military specialties or jobs. The overall plan shows how individual programs and actions reinforce one another and fit together into an effective and complete approach to training. A training strategy considers the skills and techniques to be imparted, the audience to be trained, and the environment, conditions, and constraints under which the training is to take place. A training strategy also actively considers the wartime missions of potential units of assignment of trainees, together with the skill composition and peacetime operating tempo of those units. A training strategy has performance objectives and standards that can be associated with its subordinate programs and approaches. The strategy allows an allocation of resources among training programs and entities to achieve its objectives efficiently. Plans may focus upon major military subpopulations as different and separable groups to be trained.

If a training strategy for reservists were formally documented, the document could logically be called a "Strategic Plan for Training Reservists." Since such documents do not exist, the strategies discussed in Chapter 2 have been deduced from a review of the training courses, programs, practices, and initiatives currently in place. They are *de facto*, rather than *formal* strategies. The purpose of this chapter is to describe and discuss the missing links in current strategies, and suggest some of the necessary elements that an effective strategy should have.

## ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS

A successful strategy for training members of the reserve components must consider and accommodate the unique aspects of the reserve forces and the people comprising them. LMI's earlier work<sup>1</sup> has shown that the men and women in the reserve are very similar in most respects to their counterparts in the active forces. But the unit environment is markedly different from that of the active forces (as is, occasionally, the unit itself). Those differences are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. They exert such a powerful influence, and create such serious limitations on the training of individual soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen, that a carefully designed and tailored strategy will be necessary to compensate for their impact.

We believe that any successful training strategy for the reserve components, at a minimum, must implement a series of coordinated programs and policies aimed at accomplishing the following three major objectives:

- Minimize the amount of reserve skill training needed, by acquiring and retaining more already trained people. Current practices are not always consistent with this objective; personnel and training policies should be adjusted as necessary.
- Make IDT more effective, and make its goals more realistic. Significant departures from traditional training practices, which are now designed for full-time, active-service members will be needed in some instances. Also, the training burden now placed on unit commanders should be redefined to fit within the limits of feasibility.
- Provide for improved monitoring and feedback of training results. The effective management and tailoring of reserve training requires better built-in monitoring mechanisms to provide information about the success of the strategy so that needed adjustments can be made quickly.

Specific actions and approaches that would help achieve these three objectives and should be part of an improved overall training strategy are discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

---

<sup>1</sup>LMI Report RA401. *Logistics Skill Development in the Reserve Components*. Srull, Donald W., Edward D. Simms, Jr., and Dayton S. Pickett. Oct 1985.

## REDUCE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

### Bring In More People With Relevant Active Duty Experience

We believe that the Services need to exert greater effort to attract veterans experienced in military specialties similar to those of their reserve jobs.<sup>2</sup>

There is some resistance to this suggestion. Some military leaders believe that prior-service-same-skill people produce a relatively high turnover rate when compared with unit members who do not have earlier active military service. We have been unable to find data to support this belief. Successful recruiting of more prior-active-duty people can create difficulty for the unit commander through the filling of desirable unit vacancies at higher grade levels (e.g., the E6 or E7 level). When this occurs, people of lower grade — who have served longer and successfully in the unit — may have their promotion opportunities cut off. We believe that the benefit in experience and capability that would accrue to the unit in most cases, plus the avoidance of serious training problems, should be overriding considerations. In addition, actions can and should be taken to reduce any negative impacts of recruiting more prior service people with valuable skills into high-priority reserve units. One of the most effective ways to help relieve potential promotion stagnation problems, if and when they occur, is the establishment of more flexible upper grade authorizations. If additional upper-grade (E6 through E9) positions in critical skills were authorized for specific high-priority units when opportunities occur for acquiring experienced prior service people, at least three additional benefits would result above and beyond the promotion relief provided.

- Additional journeyman and master skill level people would make the unit's OJT and OJE programs, which are essential for the apprentice level people, much more effective.

---

<sup>2</sup>The Air Force's Palace Chase program is continuing to have success in this area. The Navy for many years accepted into the Selected Reserve *only* sailors with extensive active duty experience in the Selected Reserve specialty. While the Navy departed from this policy in 1983 with the establishment of its Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) Program, concerns such as those expressed in this report have led to a marked reduction in SAM recruitment goals over the next several years.

- The presence of an additional, qualified reservist in a critical skill billet could reduce the serious and often long-term effects of an unanticipated loss of a key, trained individual.
- Additional, trained personnel within Selected Reserve units would provide valuable and known assets with key skills at the time of mobilization.

For all these reasons, we believe that a carefully structured and monitored program, providing additional upper grade billets in key skills for high-priority units, has high potential. Further, given the low annual costs of reserve manpower, and the high costs of training, such a program should be very cost-effective. As part of an overall improved training strategy, the program should have as its primary objectives (1) the increased accession of skilled personnel, and (2) the improved capability of units to conduct effective OJT/OJE programs.

New members of the guard and reserve who are veterans, but who have military experience in skills different from those required by their reserve assignments, should be required to attend full programs of initial skills training (less basic military training). This type of veteran volunteer has long been an attractive candidate for Army and Marine Corps reserve component units. Many, however, have been enlisted without subsequent attendance at Advanced Individual Training (Army) or Initial Skill Training or Skill Progression Training (Marine Corps). The training difficulties and skill deficiencies within the unit that result from such assignments can be serious. As a result, the Army has recently adopted a policy requiring attendance at Advanced Individual Training for all new members who have not had it. The Navy and Air Force have for many years routinely required their enlistees to complete this type of training.

### **Recruit More People With Related Civilian Occupations**

A common perception is that an enlisted guardsman or reservist is a person whose civilian job and military specialty augment and benefit one another. Unfortunately, it is not possible to verify that perception from the very limited information available, which is incomplete and confined to members of the Air Reserve Forces (ARF). In our earlier work on technical logistics specialties,<sup>3</sup> we found that about one-third (36 percent guard, 30 percent reserve) of the enlisted specialists of the ARF

---

<sup>3</sup>LMI Report RA401-2. *Technical Skill Training in the Reserve Components of the Air Force*. Simms, Edward D., Jr. and Dayton S. Pickett. Apr 1985. p. 3-7.

hold civilian jobs with direct benefit to their military specialties. Other LMI work has shown that enlisted ARF members assigned to the health-care fields are somewhat less apt to hold compatible civilian jobs.<sup>4</sup>

No data on civilian employment are compiled for any members of the Selected Reserve beyond those kept for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. We suspect, largely on the basis of anecdotal information compiled from scattered visits to reserve units outside the Air Force, that the incidence of civilian-military job compatibility is generally quite low. One thing is certain: none of the reserve components actively pursues the recruitment of people with compatible civilian employment as a matter of policy.

We believe that the capability of reserve units to conduct sustainment training would be enhanced if the Services enlisted greater numbers of men and women whose civilian skills contribute to their military job performance and development. The benefits of having unit members whose civilian and military jobs are mutually supportive are so great that substantial and aggressive programs would seem warranted, especially in certain highly technical skills. More can and should be done. Efforts might include special bonuses or other incentives for reservists who have "matching" jobs, and might also include a more "tailored" or negotiated military training program for the recruit who is employed in a compatible civilian job.<sup>5</sup> The contribution of that Service member to his peers – and the quality of performance of his own military duties – should improve the unit's capability.

### **Improve Retention of Journeymen and Masters**

Because of the widespread difficulty of recruiting fully qualified noncommissioned or petty officers to fill a unit vacancy, and because of the importance of these journeymen and masters to skill sustainment training in those units, skilled incumbents should receive the greatest possible encouragement by the Service to remain in their units. Conversely, losses of these people can create significant training burdens and disproportionate reductions in unit capability. Increased

---

<sup>4</sup>LMI Report RA502TR2. *Working Note: Status of Medical Units and Medical Personnel in Air Force Reserve Components.* Greenberg, Isidore M., Edward D. Simms, Jr., and Michael J. Konvalinka. Jan 1987. pp. 25 and 26.

<sup>5</sup>The Bypass Specialist Program of the Air Force is perhaps the best model of any Service's approach to this issue. Unfortunately, from our perspective, that program is used in only about 1 percent of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve enlistments.

retention, if successful, may require an adjustment of unit authorization, waiver of grade or pay limitations, or other measures to provide flexibility to deviate from traditional personnel policies and practices. Clearly, the retention of trained and qualified senior reservists with critical skills should never be discouraged because of personnel/grade structure limitations, which typically have been designed with active force units in mind. It is understood that adjustments to personnel authorizations could ultimately change the composition of some high-priority reserve units so they no longer are mirror images of units of the active forces.<sup>6</sup> But if such changes result in viable units with sufficient numbers of skilled personnel, the trade-off is a good one.

## **IMPROVE INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING**

### **Introduction**

Improving the effectiveness of IDT within guard/reserve units presents the greatest challenge to improved training of the individuals assigned to Selected Reserve units. It is here that we believe the strongest and most innovative corrective measures are warranted. The changes needed will be neither inexpensive nor simple, since our objective is to achieve unprecedented levels of peacetime reserve training proficiency.

At present, reserve unit commanders are expected to accomplish three difficult individual training tasks:

- Train apprentices (whose initial preparation at the apprentice level is almost always incomplete) to become journeymen.
- Sustain and reinforce all job skills contained within each specialty.
- Train some journeymen to become master specialists.

We believe it unrealistic to expect unit commanders in the reserve components to accomplish all these tasks successfully without access to significant additional training resources. The training burden is simply too great; it would probably not be feasible even if the training burden were reduced by enlisting more experienced

---

<sup>6</sup>The "mirror image" practice does not exist, of course, among the augmentation units of the Navy's Selected Reserve. It does exist among the commissioned units of that Selected Reserve and among most Selected Reserve units of the Army, Marine Corps and, to a lesser extent, among guard and reserve units of the Air Force.



people, as recommended in the previous section. We propose that the unit commander's training responsibility for individuals during IDT be limited to skill sustainment alone.

Six recommended initiatives that – when taken together – would provide more appropriate overall individual training and assist the unit commander in carrying out his training objectives are discussed below. These initiatives address the training of skills through journeyman level, skill sustainment in the unit, and training for skill advancement to the master level.

### **Lengthen and Focus Initial Skills Training**

The reserve training environment in general will not allow for any substantial *growth* of individual skills and abilities during IDT in units. The Military Services, therefore, should provide more complete initial skills training at the beginning of the career of each guardsman/reservist, except those who bring prior-service-same-skill experience to their reserve jobs. More extensive initial training should prepare the individual to perform essentially all, rather than a fraction, of the job tasks of the occupational specialty without supervision. At the present time, initial skills training is incomplete from the reserve component point of view in that it produces inexperienced junior apprentices only. Guardsmen and reservists should be trained to the journeyman level.

Further, we believe that initial skills training for members of the guard/reserve should take advantage of the already-known unit assignment of each of these Service members. Training should concentrate on the equipment to be found in the reserve unit of assignment, rather than on a variety of types of equipment, as is now the case. This focusing and limiting of initial skills training for members of the guard/reserve will partially offset the additional training required to produce people qualified as journeymen. This combination of efforts will require paying more attention to the management of skills training, but we believe it will measurably improve the performance of reserve units. More important, it will help the unit commander concentrate on skill sustainment training, and will make his skill sustainment activities more productive.

### **Consider Guard/Reserve Jobs When Developing and Refining Training Programs**

Training programs for individuals are based, at least in part, on the results of periodic occupational surveys. Reserve component units usually are not included in these job surveys. The tasks performed by members of the guard/reserve may be different from tasks included within the same military occupational code and performed by counterpart members of the active forces. This difficulty for guardsmen and reservists is most pronounced at the time when a major system or piece of equipment leaves the active forces and becomes guard- or reserve-unique. The Army's Duster and Air Force's A-7 systems are present examples; current training of support personnel assigned to the reserve components does not prepare them well for that portion of their unique jobs dealing directly with those systems. This further step in tailoring training programs to better fit the needs of the reserve component will be very beneficial, and well worth the added management attention it requires.

### **Increase Regional Training Opportunities**

Unit dispersion, limited equipment storage areas, and relative isolation of individual reserve technical specialists call for an expanded network of fully equipped and staffed training sites to which reserve personnel can travel periodically for weekend training. These "regional technical training centers"<sup>7</sup> are to provide access to both wartime mission equipment and experienced specialists-instructors.

The Navy has been expending some effort in this direction through its Weekend Away Training program, and those efforts will increase as regional training for Selected Reserve units is begun at several of the Navy's readiness centers within the next 2 years. Army efforts are underway to establish regional technical training sites at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and Fort Hood, Texas, with further expansion to occur in the future. The Air Force's Field Training Detachments (FTDs) also provide regional training opportunities, especially in maintenance specialties, but on a somewhat different model. While all these efforts represent a recognition of the important place of regional activities in reserve training, we propose extending and accelerating these networks and efforts even

---

<sup>7</sup>Originally described and recommended in LMI Report ML106, *A Concept for Training Reserve Component Mechanics to Support the M-1*. Simms, Edward, D., Jr. and Thomas A. White. Oct 1981

further, to include provisions for the dispatch of regional training teams to units (a practice best exemplified by Air Force FTDs) where that practice is advantageous. This concept could also make increased use of qualified trainers in reserve units like the Army Training Divisions and Army Reserve Schools.

### **Increase Full-Time Manning in Technical Skills**

The judicious use of full-time manning in guard/reserve units can improve measurably their overall training readiness. Initially, full-time staff should be assigned to take care of the essential administrative and housekeeping chores that otherwise would occupy inordinate portions of the IDT drill periods. Once these basic needs are met, the focus of full-time manning should be to aid in solving chronic problems in technical skill training. Full-time personnel who occupy positions requiring extensive technical skills are people who can attend long midcareer technical courses on full duty status, and they can act as mentors and coaches for other unit members during unit training assemblies. OJT and OJE in the unit can be effective only if a "critical mass" of such technical people is available along with the equipment necessary to conduct effective training.

In the ground forces of the Army and the Marine Corps, where increases in full-time support of this type would have the greatest benefit, early full-time manning assignments were made to command, control, and administrative positions supporting the units' operational activities. We believe that attention should now be given to buttressing those more technical specialties that are difficult to train. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve has elected to provide such manning at about the 50 percent level in several specialties within its 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Aircraft Wing. The most extreme position taken among the Services in recognition of tough-to-train specialties was recently announced by the Navy, where the Chief of Naval Reserve has identified a number of Naval Enlisted Codes that he has asked the Navy to avoid assigning to the Naval Reserve. That list is based largely upon the difficult-to-train criterion.

### **Use Private Sector Training To Teach Advanced Skills**

Drilling reservists are often unable to attend military courses that teach advanced technical skills. These courses are often lengthy (from 3 to 19 weeks for a selected group of Army enlisted midcareer courses), and reservists simply cannot take the time off from their jobs. But substitute training can very often be provided

by contracts with private sector training institutions or organizations that will agree to provide training close to where the reservists live and work and at times convenient to the reservists. These efforts can be designed to fit the specific training needs of the individual reservists, and the training can be scheduled during IDT unit assemblies, on additional evenings, weekends, or whenever reservists can gather locally for the training.

The objective of such private sector training should be the attainment of advanced, master-level skills required to perform the technical duties of the upper enlisted grades. The present system of advanced skill acquisition through OJT and OJE usually does not work satisfactorily and should be supplanted wherever possible by a contract-based system tailored to the needs of specialists in each unit. The unit commander may elect to retain responsibility for teaching these unit members the purely military skills involved, such as troop leading and military personnel management, but the technical tasks and skills of the jobs in most cases would be better taught under contract.

Some reserve units – primarily the aviation units of all four Services – currently schedule a large number of unit training assemblies and place additional active duty demands upon unit members each year. There is widespread belief that imposition of even greater time requirements upon the members of these units could injure morale and lead to loss of personnel. It is likely, however, that in such units, contracts for private sector training would be unnecessary, or could reduce the need for these additional training assemblies. In cases where a unit has a relatively rich mix of experienced people (through prior military service or civilian occupations, or both), together with a high percentage of full-time support in technical skills, training for the journeyman-to-master transition might be possible without any major private sector training augmentation. At the moment, however, a great opportunity exists for expanded, cost-effective use of contracted individual technical training.

#### **Design Training Devices and Simulators for the Guard/Reserve**

Development and design of training devices in the Military Services is based on requirements identified by active force units and schools. Active force units may see no need for training devices or simulators, because the weapon or support system itself may be available in the unit and can be used for training. Identical reserve units may need training devices because they do not have continuous access to this

real equipment or to the tools and test equipment supporting major systems. In addition, the centralized nature of much training within the active forces leads to the design and development of large-scale, expensive training devices. The more typical dispersion of reserve units calls for smaller, less expensive, more mobile devices.

## **ESTABLISH REVIEW MECHANISMS**

### **Measure Proficiency Regularly**

In active force units, supervisors evaluate the performance of subordinates on the basis of continuous, daily contacts; they correct observed performance deficiencies by OJT. It is much more difficult to evaluate the performance of members of reserve units because the contact time between supervisors and subordinates is brief and intermittent. To use the limited time available for training during IDT efficiently, commanders and supervisors need to pinpoint the training needs of each unit member. Skill knowledge and performance tests (including hands-on portions) would be a useful tool for designing and refining the IDT training plan for reserve units.

This approach should also reveal areas in the overall training strategy that require improvement. If these feedback mechanisms are employed in harmony with those undertaken regularly by the Services' training institutions, the entire structure of individual training can be kept current.

## CHAPTER 5

### RECOMMENDATIONS

To begin the development of a training strategy that will meet the specific needs of the reserve components, in support of the Total Force Policy, we recommend the following actions be taken by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)[ASD(RA)].

- *Establish a major periodic review (e.g., biennial) of reserve component training.* Such a review should involve all Military Departments and components, and should be sponsored by OSD. Since the responsibilities for Total Force training policy is now divided between OASD(RA) and OASD (Force Management and Personnel) [OASD(FM&P)], both of these offices should be active participants. The initial DoD-wide review meeting would assemble the senior training management officials (active and reserve) from all Services and have as its objectives to:
  - ▶ Define the major training issues affecting the reserve components.
  - ▶ Identify opportunities for specific improvement.
  - ▶ Provide a forum to exchange ideas.
  - ▶ Prioritize specific initiatives and programs necessary to provide effective individual training for reservists.
  - ▶ Provide for visibility and tracking of these initiatives during the annual programming-budget process.
- *Initiate and support a test program for evaluating the reserve-oriented training approaches outlined in Chapter 4.* Before a final decision is made on DoD-wide implementation of these and other new training approaches, tests should be run to further define the concepts, collect field data, and demonstrate the benefits and costs. Because the ground forces logistic support personnel present the most urgent problems, we recommend that several technical logistics MOSs in the Army be selected for use in the tests. The test program objective should be to demonstrate how specific reserve-oriented approaches can be effectively integrated into specific MOS training programs.
- *Develop a "DoD Strategic Plan for Technical Skill Training of Reservists."* Working with the ASD(FM&P), the Military Departments, and reserve components, the ASD(RA) should document the overall strategy to be

followed by DoD in working toward adequate, cost-effective training of reservists which is consistent with their postmobilization assignments and responsibilities.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3 DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT "A" Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.	
2b DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) LMI-RA503R1		5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Logistics Management Institute	6b OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 6400 Goldsboro Road Bethesda, Maryland 20817-5886		7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION OASD(RA)	8b OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER MDA903-85-C-0139	
8c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) The Pentagon, Room 3E326 Washington, DC 20301		10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO	PROJECT NO
		TASK NO	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO
11 TITLE (Include Security Classification) Needed: A Strategy for the Technical Training of Reservists			
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Donald W. Snull, Edward D. Simms, Jr., Dayton S. Pickett			
13a TYPE OF REPORT Final	13b TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) October 1987	15 PAGE COUNT 42
16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION			
17 COSATI CODES		18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Training, Reserve Components, Total Force Policy, Technical Skills, Manpower, Personnel, Logistics Skills, Reserve Forces, National Guard	
FIELD	GROUP		
	SUB-GROUP		
19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)  The most serious and continuing challenge to a workable Total Force Policy is providing adequate training for early-deploying members of the reserve components, especially those of the Army. Current policies, programs, and resources are inadequate to cope with the difficulties inherent in building and maintaining adequate technical skill levels in part-time soldiers. As equipment shortage problems of reserve units continue to be corrected, the lack of a workable training strategy will emerge as the limiting factor of Total Force effectiveness.  It is the unique environment of the reserve components that makes technical skill training of reservists extremely difficult. Reservists have limited and interrupted training time available. Reserve units are usually small in size and widely spread geographically, often great distances from supported units and work facilities. The training problem is made even more difficult when training depends heavily on on-the-job training and on-the-job experience, as it does for most technical specialties. Small reserve units with few authorized positions in each of a wide variety of skills often find it difficult, if not impossible, to conduct conventional, on-the-job training within the unit. Lack of mission equipment, training devices, and adequate full-time staffs add to the burden.  In this report, we outline a number of specific training initiatives for the reserve components. They have significant potential and should be considered in a new, overall reserve component training strategy.			
20 DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL		22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)	22c OFFICE SYMBOL



UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE



UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

END

DATE

FILMED

5-88

DTIC